CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SECOND MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 7 April 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. A. ZELLEKE (Ethiopia)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:	Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS
	Mr. A.F. DUMONT
	Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
Brazil:	Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO
	Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. CHRISTOV
	Mr. T. PETROV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U CHIT MYAING
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Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. R.W. CLARK
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. M. VEJVODA
	Mr. J. STRUCKA
	Mrs. Z. FIALOVA
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Hungary:	Mr. I. KOMIVES
	Mr. J. PETRAN
	Mr. I. SARKADI
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. N. KRISHNAN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. F.L. OTTIERI
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Japan:	Mr. I. ABE
	Mr. S. YAMADA
	Mr. H. OTSUKA
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Mexico:	Mr. M. TELLO
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Nigeria:	Alhaji SULE KOLO
	Mr. C.O. HOLLIST
	Mr. L.A. MALIKI
Pakistan:	Mr. K. AHMED
	Mr. S.A.D. BUKHARI
	Mr. T.O. HYDER
Poland:	Mr. W. NATORF
	Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
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Romania:	Mr. I. DATCU
	Mr. O. IONESCO
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Sweden:	Mrs. A. MYRDAL
	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
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Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
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	Mr. L.A. MASTERKOV
	Mr. V.B. TOULINOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. O. SIRRY
	Mr. M. ISMAIL
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	Mr. I.F. PORTER
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United States of America:	Mr. J.F. LEONARD
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	Mr. M. VUKOVIC
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I declare open the 462nd plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

2. Before calling on the first speaker may I, on behalf of the Committee, welcome Ambassador Vejvoda, the leader of the Czechoslovak delegation.

3. Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom): May I first, Mr. Chairman, echo your welcome to Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia and also, as this is the first time that I have spoken since his arrival here, my friend and colleague Ambassador Benhima of Morocco.

4. This morning I should like to concentrate on the subject of chemical and biological weapons and I want to do so, if I can, in a helpful and an objective way. I think we must at all costs avoid the danger of forming ourselves into two rigid factions in this Committee -- on the one hand those who want an agreement on chemical and biological weapons together, and who are reluctant to accept anything less, and on the other hand those who want to reach agreement on the urgent problems of biological weapons while at the same time doing what we can to bring agreement on chemical weapons closer. The difference between the two points of view is, I suggest, largely an artificial and a procedural one. I assume that what we are all searching for in the long run are suitable ways of dealing with the dangers of both types of weapon and it would be a tragedy if we frustrated that search by allowing procedural attitudes to harden in the Committee and to take the place of real measures of arms control and disarmament as the main topic of our discussions.

5. It is for that reason that I should like to express wholehearted support for the position taken by the representative of Japan, Mr. Abe, when he suggested on 10 March that

> "... the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should first try to reach basic agreements on matters of substance regarding the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, and then, as a next stage, proceed to the consideration of the legal formula embodying such agreements." (CCD/PV.456, para. 75)

6. That seems to me to be a constructive approach to our problem and it was, indeed, what I had in mind when I said in this Committee on 19 February that we were ready to fall in with the wish of the majority to discuss the prospects for progress on biological and chemical weapons together (CCD/PV.451, para. 18). I hoped that in that way we might break away from the procedural wrangle of last year and get down to the real problems. It has been encouraging to see that there have been so many contributions of substance during the first half of this session both in the general

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statements and in specific observations on the subject by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Sweden, the Netherlands, the United States, Italy, Canada and Czechoslovakia.

7. The representative of the Netherlands reinforced his Government's sympathy for the United Kingdom draft convention on biological warfare (ENDC/255/Rev.1) by suggesting certain drafting improvements (CCD/PV.458, para. 32 et seq.) which we are now discussing in London. I welcome also the support given to the United Kingdom draft by the representative of Italy (CCD/PV.453, para. 27, CCD/PV.459, para. 20). All those contributions have been made against the background of a growing body of literature and analysis of the effects of the possible use of chemical and biological weapons. We have the most useful report of the United Nations Secretary-General (A/7575/Rev.1) and the report of the Director-General of the World Health Organization[1/], and in addition we now have advance copies of some work done in this field by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)[2/].

8. This morning I should like to explain the United Kingdom point of view. At a later stage perhaps we may explore the subject further in informal meetings, together with experts from our capitals, and possibly also in a series of working papers.

9. First I should like to say a word about several statements which have been made renouncing the use of biological weapons. At the outset of course I must refer to President Nixon's statement. On 19 February I welcomed the statement made by the President of the United States on 25 November in which he renounced for the United States unilaterally the use of biological warfare (CCD/PV.451, para. 19). Such a step would of course be a considerable measure of arms control for any State. For the United States it is a measure of real disarmament involving the destruction of existing stocks and stockpiles. It has been said that biological weapons are not suitable for use in retaliation and that they have no value on the battlefield. That may be true at present, but even so it is far from saying that they are not effective weapons at all. They have already been developed to operational level and anyone who is familiar with the considerable scale of the work on biological weapons which was formerly carried out in the United States can have no doubt that President Nixon's decision represents a real measure of unilateral disarmament and one which I hope we shall soon be able to embody in an effective international agreement.

1/ Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Report of a WHO Group of Consultants, Geneva, 1970.

2/ The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare.

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10. On 17 March the representative of the Netherlands reminded us (CCD/PV.458, para. 22) that his Government in 1930 renounced unconditionally the use of bacteriological or biological weapons by limiting his Government's reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI). And on 24 March the representative of Canada also made known his Government's past and present position when he stated that

> "'Canada never has had and does not now possess any biological weapons (or toxins) and does not intend to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or use such weapons at any time in the future'" (CCD/PV.460, para. 37).

11. I should like to take this opportunity on behalf of my Government to recall what I said in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December last year (A/C.1/PV.1716, provisional, p.102), shortly after President Nixon's statement, about the position of the United Kingdom Government on biological warfare. Our position is simple and straightforward. We have never had any biological weapons, we have none now and we have no intention of acquiring any. Similarly, our research in the field of biological warfare has always been confined to defensive measures. We very much hope now that other countries will join with us in banishing these weapons for ever, as proposed in our draft convention on biological warfare. In parenthesis I might mention here that the United Kingdom draft convention, as my colleagues will know, specifically prohibits use as well as prohibiting production and acquisition and providing for the destruction of stocks of biological warfare agents or ancillary equipment and vectors. The inclusion of the word "use" in this way was a deliberate means of trying to strengthen the controls on these weapons contained in the Geneva Protocol to which many parties have entered reservations. By contrast the other draft convention, that presented by the Soviet Union and its allies (A/7655), only refers to the question of use in its preamble and there only by "Recognizing the important significance of the Geneva Protocol ..." and reaffirming adherence to its purposes and principles. In our view that inevitably leaves open a very important question, which is whether the draft of the Soviet Union and its allies would preserve the right of retaliation which, in the case of biological weapons, our draft specifically removes.

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12. In this context I was most interested to see that the representative of Yugoslavia, Mr. Vratuša, in his speech on 10 March, proposed that all countries should proceed to an

> "... immediate examination of the possibility of unilateral renunciation of research into and production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and of the closing down of all facilities directly related to research into and production and stockpiling of biological weapons." (CCD/PV.456, para. 35).

Clearly such renunciations would be useful but no one, I think, would consider that they were an entirely satisfactory substitute for a multilateral convention binding all signatory States and their successors in a proper international agreement. Nevertheless, we for our part are naturally studying carefully the implications of Mr. Vratuša's proposal.

13. Out of our discussion on chemical and biological weapons so far it seems to me that two principal aspects have emerged, and I should like to look at them a little more closely this morning. They concern on the one hand the characteristics of the weapons and on the other hand the problem of verification of agreements.

14. Let us think for a moment about the characteristics of the various weapons. I remember the time, as I expect do most of the members of the Committee, when atomic, biological and chemical weapons were all grouped together as A, B and C weapons and were put in a category distinct from conventional weapons. But it seems to me that no one today would put atomic weapons in the same category as biological and chemical weapons except possibly as weapons of mass destruction. It is true that there are points of similarity, sometimes between two of these classes of weapons, sometimes among all three. For example, both nuclear and biological weapons produce after-effects that can rebound on their user -- the one through fall-out, the other through a biological chain reaction. Again, both nuclear and germ weapons, if used, would affect vast numbers of innocent people far removed from the States using them or even the States against which they were directed. Chemical weapons on the other hand may be said to be similar to atomic weapons in that they exist and are already part of the military assessment on which the security of States is based. Some speakers have pointed out that biological and chemical weapons are alike in that they can be delivered by the same types of system; they are also relatively cheap and simple to produce, especially if they are compared with nuclear weapons. So much for the similarities that exist between some of these classes of weapons.

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15. But it is essential too, I think, to remark that there are very important differences between the categories. Perhaps the most significant -- and I have referred to this before -- is that biological and chemical weapons, unlike atomic weapons, do not destroy the equipment and weapons of the other side. Their only target is the living body. Their only use is to maim, to infect, to poison or to kill. Then, by their ability to breed in the human body, biological weapons, unlike atomic and chemical weapons, contain their own threat of retaliation. They might spread to the armies and even to the populations of the Power that used them, without any active intervention at all by the people against whom they were used, and this is to me a reflexion of the most frightening aspect of biological weapons and the most serious difference between them and any other weapon. Unlike atomic and chemical weapons, they have never been used and their effects are unpredictable and probably wholly uncontrollable.

16. Atomic and chemical weapons, on the other hand, can be more specifically used and, to some extent anyway, controlled. I do not seek to suggest that they are purely tactical in their application -- and I think from something that the representative of the Soviet Union said in his speech last week that there may be some misunderstanding here (CCD/PV.461, para. 16). I do not suggest that those weapons are purely tactical in their application. Everybody knows that they can be used strategically, but the point is that, unlike biological weapons, atomic and chemical weapons can be used tactically, and chemical weapons are less likely than either nuclear or biological weapons to affect large civilian populations far removed from the scene of their use. This I think, is a most important distinction. Yet another distinction is that the defensive measures to be deployed against atomic, biological and chemical weapons are all different and so of course, on another level, would be the treatment required after an attack that used any of them. They produce their effects at different speeds, biological weapons obviously much more slowly than the other two, and all three classes of weapon have different effects that would persist long after the initial damage they were intended to inflict.

17. I make these points, most of which are already familiar to the Committee, simply to demonstrate that the three classes of weapons of mass destruction are different, and in my view it would be foolish to pretend otherwise simply to win a debating point. It is as misleading to lump chemical and biological weapons together as it would be to regard nuclear warfare and germ warfare as the same problem, capable of being dealt with

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in one comprehensive agreement. We might all draw different conclusions from this in terms of procedure in this Committee, but let us, I beg, at least look at the facts clearly and objectively.

18. I should like to come now to the second aspect of the problem on which we have had a lot of discussion in this session, namely, that of verification. So far we have concentrated largely on the technical problems of verification in the chemical warfare field. Clearly those problems are very difficult, but I get the impression that already we have made some progress at least in defining them. In her speech on 12 March, Mrs. Myrdal described many of the problems with which we are faced (CCD/PV.457, para. 28 et seq). Mr. Roshchin, in his speech of 3 March, referred to "verification in the form, for instance, of control posts, ... on-site inspection groups and so on ..." which he then concluded "... would be simply impossible from the practical point of view since, as several representatives at the General Assembly pointed out, it would be necessary to have controllers in almost every laboratory," (CCD/PV.454, para. 59). The SIPRI report points out in this context that one would have to establish and verify the final destination of products, although it does not go into the problem of verifying the existence or absence of undeclared facilities.

19. Perhaps I might add in passing that, valuable though the SIPRI chapter on verification is, it must I think be regarded as no more than a preliminary and partial study, because it takes little account of political realities. For example, much of the factual data that it provides on production, storage and testing of chemical and biological warfare comes from only one country, the United States of America; and in both the chemical and biological sections, which are, we might note, separate, the problems of verification are discussed on the basis of declared facilities freely open to inspection. But where the technical publications and other sources of open information are freely available, of course it is possible to accept a lower standard of formal verification than in cases where the relevant information is more closely guarded.

20. On the other hand, although this study does not lead to a very encouraging view of the possibilities of verification in an arms control sense, I feel that the SIPRI experience of biological weapons inspection might well prove useful in considering the complaints procedure which is envisaged under article III, paragraph 2, of the United Kingdom draft convention. I should like to draw the attention of the Committee

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to an important aspect of this draft: it is that many of the problems and difficulties of investigating accusations of use of chemical and biological agents described in the SIPRI study would be overcome by the procedure envisaged under article III, paragraph 1, of the United Kingdom draft convention, and I commend the study of that to my colleagues in the Committee.

21. Mr. Roshchin referred to an indirect aspect of verification when he described the provision in the draft submitted by the Soviet Union and its allies for States parties to such an agreement to undertake as soon as possible the legislative and administrative measures necessary to prohibit the production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons and to ensure their destruction. He explained that:

> "The application of this article of the convention will be one of the ways of guaranteeing the implementation of this agreement and of achieving the aim of the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical and bacteriological agents of warfare." (CCD/PV.454, para. 64)

I must confess that I am not entirely convinced by this proposition. I quite understand that before ratifying any convention any State party to a treaty would have to ensure that its national legislation enabled it to fulfil its international obligations. That much is obvious. What I am not so sure about is what legislative measures would be required in a State which already directly controlled all its means of production.

22. Perhaps I should refer now to another interesting reference in the speech of Mr. Leonard of the United States of America on 17 March. He referred to the technical possibilities of verification by monitoring and inspection techniques (CCD/PV.458, para. 61), and I wonder whether even if these were politically acceptable they would be adequate for States which do not have sophisticated means of detection and monitoring at their disposal. The fact is that a chemical warfare potential is within the easy reach of the great majority of States. Any country with a well-established chemical and pharmaceutical industry could easily acquire a chemical warfare capability, probably without detection. We must therefore evolve verification procedures that can be adopted universally, globally, and which take account of both technical and political difficulties.

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23. One further problem of verification in the chemical warfare field was raised by Mrs. Myrdal in her speech on 12 March when she suggested that it might be necessary to differentiate between certain chemical agents which could be unconditionally prohibited and verified as effectively as possible and other chemical agents which would have to be conditionally prohibited and perhaps subjected to an obligatory reporting procedure (CCD/PV.457, para.45 et seq.). We look forward to hearing more from Mrs. Myrdal about these concepts and in due course perhaps her views on whether, if I may quote her previous speech:

> "... our Committee should work out one comprehensive treaty, such as exists in regard to the prohibition of the use of chemical and biological warfare, or two or perhaps even several separate treaties on the wide complex of prohibiting also development, production, stockpiling, etc. in this field" (ibid., para.57).

My preliminary view -- although I have said that I would very much like to hear more on these concepts -- is that with several separate treaties in the field of chemical weapons the problems of verification would become even more complicated than they are now. But the same difficulty does not exist with separate treaties for biological and chemical weapons, and the United Kingdom draft, I suggest, deals with a complete category of weapons in a coherent and consistent manner.

24. Before I leave the subject of verification I think it might be as well to remind ourselves -- although I am sure that no one in this room needs reminding of it -- that disarmament and arms control are not simply technical matters; they are highly political as well. We cannot deal with disarmament here in Geneva in a vacuum. The safety of all our peoples is at stake. It is possible to argue -- and I myself would argue it strongly, and have done so here in the past -- that the only real security for any of us lies in a disarmed world, a world subject to the rule of law, from which violence and the threat of violence in pursuit of national interests has been completely and effectively banished. But we do not live in that world yet. We live in a world of independent nation States, of military alliances and of weapons of appalling destructive power. And while we are seeking, as we must seek, to achieve effective measures of real disarmament we cannot ignore the realities of the world we live in.

25. The object of any arms control measure is to increase security for all of us; or at any rate to ensure that it is not diminished. If we try to ban chemical weapons

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without an effective verification system the risks to security may be great -- too great, in fact, for many countries to accept. In the first place, the threat of retaliation in kind is still the most potent force against the use of chemical weapons. This is not the case with biological weapons which, as I have already said, contain their own built-in threat to the country that uses them. Secondly, there would be very significant military disadvantages to a State which renounced chemical weapons but which could not be sure that its adversary also had renounced them and no longer had them. The fact is -- and this cannot be said too often -- that chemical warfare, unlike biological warfare, is a form of warfare which has a substantial history of actual use and of which large and comprehensive armouries already exist. It is possible to doubt the value of chemical weapons in any specific military situation; but as an example let us look at two of the purely military implications, which might affect anybody, of a situation in which one side in a conflict had chemical weapons and the other had not. Suppose that the first country used nerve gas against the troops of the other. With no chemical weapons with which to retaliate the immediate temptation would be to escalate the war to a much higher level, possibly even in some cases causing the nuclear threshold to be crossed. Furthermore, even if chemical warfare were not actually started, the country which had no chemical weapons but which could not be sure that its adversary had given them up would have to equip itself with all the expensive and cumbersome paraphernalia of defensive equipment.

26. I say this and I give these apparently small military examples not in any attempt to confuse or cloud the issue but rather to try to clear it, because we must realize, I think, that no responsible government is likely in the present world climate to take what it would consider to be unjustifiable risks with the safety of its people and the effectiveness of its military forces. So we shall need adequate verification of any agreement to ban the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. For this reason I must say in all honesty that so long as some countries remain resolutely opposed to effective verification systems an early agreement that would cover both biological and chemical weapons is, to put it very mildly, unlikely.

27. Certainly let us make what progress we can in controlling both these weapons, but let us not succumb to futility and frustration. Even if we cannot agree immediately on a treaty covering chemical weapons, surely an agreement to eliminate

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disease as an instrument of war would be no mean achievement for this Committee. Quite apart from its value in building up confidence in the arms-control field, we cannot ignore the possibility of some sudden scientific breakthrough which could be applied to the technology of biological warfare, some development which would at one stroke destroy all our hopes of eliminating this weapon, perhaps for ever. It might be appropriate at this stage to mention that the representative of the Soviet Union, in his speech on 2 April, said that my delegation and that of the United States had advanced the argument that biological weapons were:

> "... more dangerous than chemical weapons and that therefore their development, production and stockpiling should be prohibited separately and prior to the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons ..." (CCD/PV.461, para.14)

Mr. Roshchin quoted this and seemed to regard it as unconvincing. My delegation would be the last to belittle the harmful effects of the chemical weapons that were used in the First World War. Indeed, the representative of the United States in his speech on 17 March, himself quoted the figure of 100,000 fatal casualties (CCD/PV.458, para.58) mentioned by Mr. Roshchin on 2 April. I think it might be as well to keep that figure of 100,000 in our minds for a moment and then, in comparison, to consider the appalling effects of biological weapons if they were used. Let us take one small example, and let us use the very unemotional language of the report of the Director-General of the World Health Organization in a section dealing with anthrax as a biological agent. That report says:

> "Heavy concentrations of anthrax spores in aerosols are feasible. This could result in up to 70-80% fatalities in untreated cases ... and in domesticated livestock, with less infection and a lower fatality rate in areas where aerosol dilution occurs. Antibiotic treatment would have to be prolonged for weeks, since it has been shown that monkeys exposed to aerosols die if antibiotic therapy is discontinued after 10 days... Vaccines available at present might not protect efficiently against heavy aerosol exposure. Food contamination would require prolonged sterilization to make all animal and food products safe. The environment would be contaminated indefinitely, and restocking with livestock and all aspects of food production would be rendered difficult for a long period. Air carriage of spores could be expected to contaminate localities far distant from the area of immediate attack."[1/]

1/ Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Report of a WHO Group of Consultants, Geneva, 1970, p.75.

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28. Let us take that report and translate it from the language of the laboratory to the language of ordinary men and women. What we are being told is that if anthrax spores were used in heavy concentrations against civilian populations -- and that is well within the capacity of military scientists even now -- millions of men, women and children would die an agonizing and revolting death: millions, not one hundred thousand. We are being told that antibiotics would be powerless to save them even if they could be continuously and carefully treated for weeks after the attack — in itself an unlikely contingency in the conditions of fear, chaos and panic that would follow such an attack; that food and crops would be poisoned and animals would be diseased; and that all this would spread unchecked and uncontrolled far beyond the place where the germs were first used. Germs have a habit of ignoring national frontiers. It would be no good pleading neutrality or non-combatant status, or invoking the protection of the Geneva Convention, and it would be no use even for the attacking country to vaccinate its own people for protection against infection.

29. Surely no one can seriously suggest that this is not a weapon of an appallingly different kind from any other that man has yet imagined for his own destruction -- the killing of millions of human beings and animals by deliberate infection with a fatal disease and the poisoning of the human environment in a way that we have as yet no idea how to control. If we have a chance to eliminate this as a weapon of war and we throw that chance away in pursuit of some sterile procedural wrangle we shall deserve to be called callous, stupid and barbaric.

30. On the other hand I must firmly reject a conclusion that has been drawn from this emphasis of ours on biological warfare. Mr. Roshchin argued on 2 April that in advocating separate treatment of the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons we had proposed an indefinite postponement of the prohibition of chemical warfare (CCD/PV.461, para.7). I assure members of the Committee unequivocally that that is most certainly not the intention of the United Kingdom delegation; nor does it follow in any way from what we have proposed. Indeed, article V of our draft convention clearly envisages future measures to deal with chemical weapons. And to demonstrate that we are serious about this let me say here and now that if there are any delegations here which do not think that that article is clear enough or sufficiently strongly worded to satisfy them we shall be glad to consider any alternative wording they might

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like to put forward. Our interest is that this Committee should address itself practically to the problems arising from the proposal to eliminate both biological and chemical weapons and, as I have said, we are glad that the Committee is getting down to doing just that. We must first identify the problems, then we must agree, I suggest, on solutions for those problems which are immediately amenable to solution; and, as we see it, those are more likely to be the problems of biological weapons than the problems of chemical weapons. But, far from providing an excuse for not tackling chemical weapons, the solution of the biological warfare problem will in our view help us in our approach to the less immediately tractable problems of chemical weapons.

31. To sum up, I make three simple points, as dispassionately as I can and with full understanding of the point of view of those who differ from this approach. First, biological weapons are of a unique kind: they are unlike any other weapons in their possible use and in the appalling nature of their possible effect. Second, if we try to negotiate an agreement including both biological and chemical weapons we shall take a very long time, and time is not on our side. If we do not eliminate germ warfare once and for all it may soon be too late. Therefore -- and this is my third point -- it is better to have an agreement on biological weapons than no agreement at all. Let us do what we can now and tackle the more intractable problems patiently and realistically.

32. The human race is developing an unfortunate habit of missing the boat in its search for peace. When the Baruch plan for the international control of nuclear energy was allowed to founder on suspicion and mistrust we missed one of the biggest boats in history. The biological weapons boat may be an even bigger one, and it is one that we shall miss only at the risk of our very survival.

33. Mr. CHRISTOV (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): I should like on behalf of the Bulgarian delegation to make some comments on the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the importance of which merits the attention devoted to it by our Committee. I should like first to recall briefly certain facts which in our opinion are of special interest at this point in our discussions, when we are obliged once again to revert to problems which we were entitled to feel had been solved -- for example, those relating to the nature of chemical and biological weapons.

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34. We know that the problem of those weapons was raised and studied almost immediately after the massive use of poison gases in the 1914-18 war. The urgency with which the question was brought before the League of Nations and the impressive number of conferences, commissions and committees which dealt with it can, of course, be explained by the horror which the recourse to such means of waging war has always aroused, but it might be asserted with even greater reason that the use for the first time and on such a scale of poisonous gases revealed to the world the advent of a new and terrible threat. War ceased to be a confrontation of armed forces and one entered the period of the use of weapons of mass destruction which strike blindly, without discrimination between combatant forces and civilian populations. In this connexion one has only to refer to the evidence contained in the report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on the problem of chemical and biological weapons[1/].

35. In their replies to an enquiry carried out by the Committee appointed to consider the question of Chemical and Bacteriological weapons of the Temporary Mixed Commission set up by the Council of the League of Nations in 1921 two eminent scientists of the time described the danger as follows. Professor Mayer stated that the nations of the world must understand how terrible is the threat which hangs over them. Professor Angeli stated that the use of asphyxiating gases marks the appearance of a new and terrible weapon, and it is difficult to forecast what forms that weapon may later take. Thus it was the evidence of the dangers which chemical and bacteriological means present as weapons of mass destruction that inspired the will and the haste to promote adequate measures against the evil and which led to the Geneva Protocol (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI).

36. Nowadays we speak frequently of the great progress which has been achieved in the development and the possibilities of producing vast amounts of chemical and biological substances which lend themselves more easily to use in times of war and which possess greater killing capacity. It should be noted that the term "progress" is used here in a purely military sense. As soon as the word "progress" is used in the sense which should interest us, the members of the Committee on Disarmament, it takes on a completely different meaning, that of increased danger. In the actual

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situation characterized by this progress in the field of chemical and biological weapons we feel we are fortunate in having available that instrument of international law, the Geneva Protocol, which prohibits totally and completely the use of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents.

37. We believe firmly that absolutely nothing which has occurred since the discussions held fifty years ago, neither the new scientific discoveries nor progress in technology, authorizes us to seek to impair the Geneva Protocol, to try to interpret it in an arbitrary manner, to revise the views of experts concerning the nature and characteristics as weapons of agents which can be used in conflicts or in any way whatever. Nothing authorizes us to upset a system of defence against the use of banned weapons which has stood the test of time, to create confusion concerning it, to attack its legal, moral, scientific and political bases and thus to undermine what is so fragile and delicate at the present time -- confidence in international agreements, in the hope of possible progress on the road to disarmament.

38. The obstacles which prevent our setting out on and travelling quickly along this path have been described quite adequately here. They arise from the attitudes, the positions and the efforts in the opposite direction. They are shown in the fact that certain States have not yet acceded to the Geneva Protocol, forty-five years after its signature and despite the repeated appeals of the General Assembly of the United Nations. They are also shown -- and this is a very serious matter -- in the charges of position with respect to the Protocol, as in the case of those governments referred to at our meeting on 12 March by the representative of Sweden, which aim, to use Mrs. Myrdal's words "to establish a unilateral reinterpretation of the scope of the existing prohibition." (CCD/PV.457, para.32).

39. Usually an attempt is made to justify these changes in position and these new interpretations on the grounds of the progress in the technology of modern weapons. In this connexion we must point out that such progress is always accompanied by an extremely disturbing phenomenon. The more effective a newly-developed weapon is considered to be, the less disposed are the military to renounce its use. On the contrary, there is no lack of appropriate theories to justify the possible use of this weapon, to make it acceptable and to get us used to living with it. It appears to us that that is the case with certain chemical weapons. Several statements on this subject can serve to illustrate the phenomenon to which I have just referred, as

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well as the attempts to retrogress. Attempts are made to use technological progress as a pretext for reopening the discussion which led to the total prohibition of all asphyxiating gases and bacteriological agents. It is said that the aim pursued is the working out of new international instruments. However, such new instruments are not designed to strengthen the Geneva Protocol but -- no matter what may be said -- are aimed at relaxing the legal, political and moral obligations of the Protocol, which are no doubt considered too severe, and securing freedom from its restraints in order to legalize the use in war of certain of the products of technological progress.

40. In other words, it is not a matter of adopting measures which are made necessary by technological progress in order to prevent, limit and completely eliminate the increasing dangers -- in other words, radical measures concerning the design, production, stockpiling and destruction of chemical and biological weapons; it is a question of correcting or amending an existing ban by slight alterations or unilateral re-interpretations in order to adapt it to certain doctrines according to which the use of several chemical means, for example, presents obvious advantages.

41. My delegation has always been part of the majority which considers the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons as an indivisible whole, which as such must be studied within the framework of a global solution of its various aspects. In view of the fact that the use in war of these weapons is banned under the Geneva Protocol, we are convinced that the supplementary measures which must be adopted in this field are those contained in the draft convention presented to the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly by the nine socialist countries (A/7655).

42. For the reasons which we have endeavoured to present here, my delegation is opposed to any attempt to examine separately the problem of biological weapons only. The threat to the Geneva Protocol inherent in such an approach was clearly shown during the discussion on this point. Most members of the Committee put forward relevant categorical arguments against the draft convention presented by the United Kingdom delegation (ENDC/255/Rev.1). Permit me to recall one argument which in our opinion is absolutely convincing. With regard to the ban, such a convention would be redundant because the ban already exists. Moreover, one might ask what need there could be in that case to try to conclude a special convention merely to make certain arrangements concerning the production, and so on, of biological weapons only.

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43. In this connexion I should like to express another preoccupation of my delegation. In our opinion, the conclusion of a new convention on biological weapons alone would entail other doubly negative elements. A first negative effect would be to stop, or at least to defer -- and for an indeterminate period of time -- the discussion on chemical weapons, which is by far the most important problem in the complex of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

44. It might be argued that the United Kingdom draft contains an article according to which the parties to the convention undertake "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures to strengthen the existing constraints on chemical methods of warfare." (ibid., article V) I should like to point out that under that article the debate on chemical weapons is relegated to a more or less vague future and at the same time is removed from the framework of the Geneva Protocol and placed on another level where it is a question only of "measures to strengthen the existing constraints on chemical methods of warfare." We feel that the word "constraints" hides a second danger of revision of the Geneva Protocol. It is not a matter of questioning the good faith of a delegation, in this case that of the United Kingdom, or of questioning its intentions. We are trying to see what will really happen.

45. Having said this, I should like now to examine more closely the arguments put forward by certain delegations which support the United Kingdom draft and in particular the expression of support for the draft by the representative of the United States during the meeting of the Committee on 17 March. When referring to the report of the Secretary-General (A/7575/Rev.1) and to the estimates according to which a single bomber would affect an area of up to 100,000 sq. km. in the case of biological weapons, 300 sq. km in the case of nuclear weapons and barely 60 sq. km. in the case of chemical weapons, Ambassador Leonard stressed this great destructive potential of biological weapons and stated: "Thus biological weapons present a clear danger to mankind, especially to an unprotected civilian population." (CCD/PV.458, para.51) This is perfectly true and the entire world has never hidden its indignation at the idea that one day it might be possible to resort to such a dangerous and horrible weapon.

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46. Unfortunately, and I say this with the greatest regret, it has proved impossible for us to understand the reasoning which has led to this emphasis on the danger of biological weapons. We are left with the impression that the proposal to ban the use of bilogical weapons is not due to the danger which they present but rather to certain drawbacks in those arms, to the many disadvantages which make them unclean, ineffective, awkward to handle and even dangerous to those who would venture to use them. According to the United States delegation, "the reasons why an agreement on biological weapons would be worth while" (ibid., para. 48) would be essentially military and technical, linked with the grave risks entailed by their use and with their doubtful value as a means of reprisal. There is a good deal to be said about this way of tackling a problem of this importance within the framework of negotiations on disarmament. I shall confine myself today to asking two questions. What would be the value and the scope of an agreement designed to ban biological weapons, that is, weapons considered by military experts to be unusable? What merit could the Committee claim in that case?

47. I should now like to make some remarks concerning chemical weapons. It goes without saying that the purpose is not to compare them with biological weapons but to comment on the arguments put forward by some delegations and in particular by the United States and the United Kingdom in support of their thesis in favour of a separate solution for the two types of weapons. Some of those arguments, those which in our opinion deserve the most attention from the Committee, are those which refer to the characteristics and military value of chemical weapons. Those weapons, like biological weapons, are strategic weapons. Thus the thesis according to which strategic weapons are biological weapons, whereas chemical weapons would be only tactical weapons, is completely groundless, as was pointed out quite rightly by the representative of the Soviet Union (CCD/PV.461, para. 11 et seq.). Assertions of this type have but one goal, to separate at all costs chemical weapons from biological weapons. But who could maintain that the thousands of tons of defoliants now dumped in certain regions are tactical weapons? In addition, the progress on devices called "means of delivery" -- long-range aircraft, missiles and so on, which did not exist during the First World War -- makes it possible to use weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, in a manner altogether different from that employed half a century ago.

48. In the statement on 17 March to which we have already referred the representative of the United States stressed a number of advantages of chemical weapons over biological weapons. Their effects are easier to forecast and to control; they have immediate

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effects, and this is an important advantage for their use on battlefields; chemical weapons have an obvious usefulness in certain military situations (CCD/PV.458, para.58). No doubt there are yet other advantages. Perhaps more should be said about "certain military situations". We will only say that all this must be true and, moreover, a number of delegations have referred frequently to the terrible power of those chemical weapons, especially the modern nerve gases, which are both more poisonous and better adaptable than the gases used during the First World War. But it is precisely for those reasons that the United Nations General Assembly has issued appeal after appeal for all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol which bans the use of chemical weapons and that is why we absolutely must conclude an agreement as quickly as possible for the prohibition of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of those weapons and for the destruction of existing stocks.

49. Of course, we are aware of the existence of certain difficulties and particularly those which are linked with the problem of control, since those are the ones which are most frequently raised. We are not trying to minimize them or to evade them. However, if we are to succeed in our task we must start by understanding that the aim is not to control the entire chemical industry, which would be one way of transforming the verification issue into an insurmountable obstacle.

50. Regardless of what may be said, chemical products intended for commercial purposes are not yet chemical weapons. The manufacturers of chemical products which are intended for military purposes do not manufacture them on their own; they receive specific orders from governmental agencies. After all, it is the governments which, pursuing an armaments policy, take all decisions concerning studies, experiments, development, etc. of chemical weapons. And it is at governmental level that the agreement will be concluded, with the necessary control measures. But I feel that we shall have a chance to revert to this aspect of the problem when, very soon as we hope, the proposals of the Polish delegation on this subject are submitted.

51. Before I finish with this question I should like to say a few words about the allegations made here that a distinction can be made between so-called lethal gases and other so-called inoffensive and even humanitarian gases. I cannot imagine that the Committee could assume the grave responsibility of classifying chemical weapons in this way and thus legalizing the use in war of certain tear or incapacitating gases such as CS, for example, which is particularly in question. Moreover, no task of this nature has

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ever been assigned to the Committee, which is called upon to devote all its efforts in this sector in conformity with General Assembly resolution 2603 B (XXIV) (CCD/275). Therefore I subscribe fully to the words of the representative of India, Ambassador Husain, who said on 12 March:

> "... no existing or prospective party to the [Geneva] Protocol can, with a view to excluding harassing or incapacitating chemical agents from the prohibition under the Protocol, legitimately make a distinction between lethal and non-lethal chemical agents. There is a grave risk in allowing the use in war of CS or any kind of gas, because of the danger of escalation leading to the use of other gases." (CCD/PV.457, para.20)

52. I should like to say a few words in this respect about this CS gas which was presented to us as a harmless form of smoke which, when used in time of war, would tend to spare human lives. Of course, all our doubts in this respect remain because history teaches us that war has never been waged with the purpose of sparing human lives. In the Sunday Times of 5 April there is a long article in which the true nature of CS gas is made quite clear, with photographs to support the text. As a result of experiments carried out in the United States and of the use of gas in certain wars, it is clear that CS is definitely a dangerous chemical agent which causes serious burning of the skin and infects the lungs. The author of the article refers to the opinion of a number of scientists and others who are quite categorical on this subject. A member of the United States Congress, for example, says:

> "The ultimate myth employed by chemical and biological warfare advocates is to justify their development and use [of these weapons] as 'humane' weapons. We have no weapons which can incapacitate without producing fatalities."

53. To finish with this question, I should like to refer to a passage in a letter addressed to the President of the United States on 14 February 1967 and signed by several thousand persons, including 22 Nobel Prize winners and 127 members of the United States National Academy of Sciences:

> "The employment of any one CB weapon weakens the barriers to the use of others. No lasting distinction seems feasible between incapacitating and lethal weapons or between chemical and biological warfare. The great variety of possible agents forms a continuous spectrum from the temporarily incapacitating to the highly lethal. If the restraints on the use of one kind of CB weapon are broken down, the use of others will be encouraged."

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54. Before concluding, allow me to raise one question which in my opinion is not without interest. We know that during the lengthy discussions on various problems of disarmament it has been pointed out very frequently that any method of negotiation based on the principle of "all or nothing" is wrong and endangers the chances of success. Perhaps it would be opportune to recall those remarks with regard to the problem of verification in the case we are now considering.

55. But my purpose is quite different today. I was very much impressed by the declaration by the representative of the United States that "if we try to eliminate both weapons at once and in the same manner, I fear that we shall have accomplished nothing at the end of a prolonged discussion." (CCD/PV.458, para.66) As I understood it, the representative of the United Kingdom seemed to speak on the same lines today. It is possible that the exact meaning of this declaration escapes us. Does it means, for example, that we have either an agreement on biological weapons only or no agreement at all, even if the discussions are prolonged? Under these circumstances, should we not ask what is the character of the negotiations that we are carrying out, and what are its prospects? Is this an approach which makes it possible to reach any constructive discussions? I do not wish to press this point further.

56. U CHIT MYAING (Burma): Since this is the first time that I am speaking at the current session of the Conference, may I take this opportunity to welcome to our midst our new colleagues from Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Japan, Morocco, Poland and Romania. We look forward to friendly and fruitful co-operation with all of them.

57. We stand today on the threshold of a new decade and it would seem relevant that we should join other delegations in what might be termed a stocktaking of the work of this Committee before we embark upon the future that the seventies have in store for us. In setting out our views we consider the very thoughtful statement made by the Secretary-General at the opening of the present session (CCD/PV.450, para.5 et seq.) to be invaluable advice which should have a salutary effect upon our deliberations here. We are also glad to mention that the interesting statements made by other representatives should help this Committee to adopt appropriate procedures which should facilitiate the discussion of substantive issues and to draw up a comprehensive programme of work.

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58. We can say that we have entered the new decade in favourable conditions both within this Committee and outside it. We have before us a number of resolutions which should serve as guidelines in our work on general and complete disarmament as well as on other important measures of substance. It is also with hopeful anticipation that we await the outcome of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks which will be conducted during the course of this month. We hope that these auspicious beginnings will be the precursors of substantial achievements in the decade of the seventies.

59. In making an assessment of our past work we feel that achievements have been few and far between and relate to measures designed to facilitate the containment of the arms race rather than to real disarmament measures. Nevertheless, we do not underestimate their political and psychological significance and their positive effect on general disarmament as a whole.

60. In the decade that has just passed there have been some achievements in measures leading to disarmament but not in disarmament measures of substance. This is because the nature of these measures is such that they lend themselves more easily to solution than disarmament measures of substance, on which efforts have been exerted also but which have so far defied solution. Efforts to curb the geographical spread of nuclear armaments have not by any means prevented their continuing increase and as a result it would seem that zones of proliferation in which these weapons continue to multiply are a condition with which we now have to live. Needless to say, nuclear disarmament is the crux of the problem of general and complete disarmament, and if we are to save mankind from the threat of nuclear annihilation nuclear disarmament measures must constitute the primary task to be tackled in the decade of the seventies. This, however, by no means implies that we should abandon the possibility of finding ways and means of achieving other measures of disarmament, as well as collateral measures which would facilitate disarmament, build confidence between States and contribute towards the relaxation of international tension; for in our search for disarmament we should leave no avenue unexplored, no stone unturned.

61. In the implementation of any project or task a well-conceived plan or programme is not only essential but is necessary to ensure success. It was therefore most appropriate for the General Assembly to entrust us with the task of drawing up a comprehensive

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programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which should provide the Conference with guidelines in charting the course of its further work and negotiations (resolution 2602 E(XXIV); CCD/275). It therefore devolves upon us to draw up such a programme, and as this should form the cornerstone for our future course of action it is essential that it should not be a mere statement of principles but should set out the measures necessary with sufficient flexibility, so that we do not commit ourselves to rigid deadlines. The programme should also serve as a viable link between this Committee and the General Assembly and should facilitate such periodical analysis of progress as may be necessary from time to time.

62. It has been pointed out by the Secretary-General as well as by representatives in this Committee that the elements of such a programme already exist in the draft treaties on general and complete disarmament tabled in 1962 by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1) and the United States (ENDC/30 and Add.1-3) respectively as well as in other documents. It therefore appears that a reappraisal of the plans elaborated in the two draft treaties is a necessary element of our programme of work.

63. We have said in the past that to have truly effective discussions on disarmament it is essential to have maximum representation of the major military Powers, and particularly all nuclear Powers. We would therefore stress once again the importance of the participation of France and the People's Republic of China also in disarmament negotiations.

64. Next we should like to offer our comments on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, as they represent a very favourable development which affects not only the work of the Committee but also the future of disarmament negotiations in general. We believe that those talks are an indication that the super-Powers intend to seek security through disarmament and not through the further intensification of the nuclear arms race. A halt in the strategic nuclear arms race would, in our opinion, mark the beginning of the process of limitation and reduction of nuclear arsenals and their eventual elimination; and it is important to stress that those talks cannot be held in isolation from the developments outside which bear a direct relationship to them. An atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence is a necessary condition for the attainment of positive results; therefore any further intensification of the strategic arms race not only is incompatible with these negotiations but also might create unfavourable repercussions.

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65. It is therefore with that concern in our minds and in accordance with the fervent hopes expressed in resolution 2602 A(XXIV) of the General Assembly that we join once again in the appeal to the super-Powers made by the Secretary-General, as well as by members of this Committee, to exercise mutual restraint and refrain from further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapon systems. Such a step would be conducive to the creation of a favourable atmosphere for the impending negotiations and would pave the way for the achievement of a formal arrangement on the freezing of strategic nuclear weapon systems.

66. Another factor that bears a definite relationship to the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks is the testing of nuclear weapons underground, which, despite repeated appeals by the General Assembly, continues unabated. Mr. Smith, the representative of the United States, remarked in his statement of 17 February that

> "...although the sixties did not witness revolutionary breakthroughs, such as the development of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, they saw a continuing refinement and deployment of nuclear weapons and extraordinary developments of strategic delivery systems, both offensive and defensive." (CCD/PV.449, para.15)

In this context it would seem pertinent to mention that underground nuclear weapon tests are conducted not only for the purpose of improving existing nuclear weapon systems but also for the discovery of basically new types of nuclear weapons. It would therefore appear to us that continued underground testing does not create stable conditions for conducting negotiations, as there might be a lurking fear on both sides that their security position could be adversely affected by the other party's achieving a revolutionary breakthrough in the development of nuclear weapons.

67. For those reasons it becomes more urgent than ever for this Committee to concentrate its efforts on the early achievement of an agreement on the banning of underground nuclear tests. We believe that negotiations over the past years have produced all the basic elements necessary for the conclusion of such a treaty and that what is now required is a decisive step forward by both the super-Powers.

68. Permit me now to express my thoughts on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, to which we are required to give urgent consideration in accordance with resolution 2603 B(XXIV) (CCD/275) of the General Assembly. We might say that a considerable advance has been made in the discussions and that it is necessary to move forward towards the ultimate solution of the problem in its totality.

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Progress has been achieved in consolidating the norms of international law with regard to prohibition of the use of those weapons, which it is hoped will assist our further efforts towards the prohibition of their development, production and possession. The recommendations in the Secretary-General's foreword to the experts' report (A/7575/Rev.1, p.viii), which my delegation believes sets out the right course to follow, served as guidance to the international community in the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2603 (XXIV).

69. Resolution 2603 A(XXIV) has affirmed the comprehensive nature of the prohibition of the use in war of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons under the generally recognized rules of international law as embodied in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI). In our opinion the comprehensive prohibition would include the use in war of all chemical, bacteriological and biological agents, including tear gas and other harassing agents, which now exist or which may be developed in the futur.. We therefore consider that any restricted interpretation by some States which condone the use of tear gas and other harassing agents in armed conflicts would be detrimental to the interests of the international community as a whole. Very cogent and sound reasons have been exhaustively adduced by representatives of other delegations as to why those agents of warfare are considered as being prohibited under the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and it is not necessary, therefore, for my delegation to repeat them.

70. We have now reached a stage where attention should be devoted to the prohibition of the development, production and acquisition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and in that connexion we now have before us the drafts presented by the United Kingdom, dealing with biological weapons (ENDC/255/Rev.1), and the Soviet Union and other socialist States, dealing with both chemical and biological weapons (A/7655). We consider them as being sincere attempts on the part of their respective sponsors to arrive at solutions and we should like to give our general conceptions of the principles involved before offering our comments on the text of those drafts.

71. It appears to us that there is an organic link between chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons which would merit their consideration together. No doubt they have certain characteristics which are dissimilar, but their common feature would seem to be that they are both weapons of mass destruction having a lethal or incapacitating effect on man and a destructive capacity in the ecological environment in which he lives. These basic similarities would make it possible to use one type of weapon as an

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alternative to the other for military purposes. Then again we have been told that biological weapons have never been used and that few nations appear to have been engaged in substantial efforts to develop them, while on the other hand chemical weapons have been used in warfare and a number of countries have developed chemical warfare capability. That leads us to the conclusion that the elimination of chemical weapons together with biological weapons would have a far-reaching impact on disarmament. In our view therefore we should commence by seeking to obtain a comprehensive ban rather than begin by settling for less, which cannot be considered to be a positive approach that would enhance the prospects of arriving at a comprehensive solution.

72. As regards the treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, the process of bilateral drafting by the co-Chairmen, with due consideration for the proposals of other members is a favourable evolution of events that should help us in achieving the final draft which we are required to present to the next General Assembly. My delegation therefore would prefer to wait for the submission of the revised draft before offering further views on that issue, on which the prospects of an agreement seem to be in sight.

73. Alhaji SULE KOLO (Nigeria): As this is my first intervention this session, I wish to welcome on behalf of the Nigerian delegation those representatives who have recently joined us. I welcome Ambassador Saraiva Guerreiro of Brazil, Ambassador Datcu of Romania, Ambassador Abe of Japan, Ambassador Natorf of Poland, Ambassador Erdembileg of Mongolia, Ambassador Benhima of Morocco, who has rejoined us, and Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia. I am quite confident that this Committee will benefit from the knowledge and experience of these distinguished personalities. May I be permitted also to express my sincere appreciation and welcome to my good friend Mr. Epstein, on whom now rests the heavy burden of organizing the work of this Committee. I request him to be good enough to convey to Dr. Protitch our sincere regards and best wishes for a speedy recovery.

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74. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*) happily entered into force on 5 March, some eighteen months after it was opened for signature in Moscow, in Washington and in London. It took seven years of serious negotiations and, if proof be needed of the importance of the Treaty, that time element is such. But more than that, the Treaty has been described by no less a personality than the Secretary-General of the United Nations as the most important measure of arms control and disarmament on which agreement has yet been reached. The coming into force of the Treaty is indeed an historical event and proof of the genuine desire of humanity for universal peace, progress and security. Although the Treaty needed forty-three ratifications before coming into force, that is, ratification by about a third of the international community, it cannot as yet be considered as having achieved universality. It is therefore the hope of my delegation that with the impressive support the Treaty has so far received around the world those countries that have not yet signed or ratified it will feel sufficiently encouraged to do so in the very near future.

75. In extolling the importance of the non-proliferation Treaty we must maintain a sense of proportion. It is true that, viewed against the ultimate objective of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which is general and complete disarmament, the Treaty is but a tiny step forward; but since the ultimate objective is unattainable without such a step, there is no doubt that it is indeed a significant one. A child must learn to walk before he can run, and if a child naturally destined to excel in running is paralysed before he learns the skill, it is obvious that he may never attain that excellence. The analogy here is that the non-proliferation Treaty represents those small steps which prove that the world, with mutual confidence and good will, is still capable of attaining its ultimate goal of disarmament. Although the Treaty is designed to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we are aware that there are two forms of that dreadful phenomenon: vertical as well as horizontal proliferation. While the non-nuclear-weapon States undertake not to develop or be assisted in developing nuclear weapons, they have the right to expect that the nuclear-weapon States will carry out fully their part of the obligations under the non-proliferation Treaty.

76. The entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty also raises the important question of the arrangements for an international safeguard system. We are pleased to note that the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),

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of which my country is a member, is already grappling with that problem. In order to ensure that the provisions of article III of the non-proliferation Treaty are fully and effectively carried out, my country has declared support for the United Kingdom resolution which I am glad to say has now been approved by the Board of Governors of IAEA as document Gov./1383 and which envisages among other things the creation of a committee of that body to assist in formulating a model agreement that will be signed between IAEA and the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty. We are fully aware that there are some legal as well as financial issues involved in these arrangements. In addition, there is also the time element, since the non-proliferation Treaty is quite clear on the length of time after its entry into force by which the agreement should be concluded. As regards the financial aspect of the safeguard agreement, the view of my delegation coincides with that expressed in the declaration in which the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia expressed their belief:

> "... that all countries will be ensured the same treatment with regard to the contents and modalities of control of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and that the expenditure for the system of control will be regulated in a way not burdening the non-nuclear-weapon States and, in particular, the developing countries." (CCD/278.)

77. Resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of the United Nations General Assembly declares the 1970s as the Disarmament Decade (CCD/275). Experience has shown that in any field of human endeavour better results are achieved if objectives are clearly defined and a definite programme of work is established. A good beginning, they say, is half the battle. We are pleased to note that a number of propitious events heralded the dawn of the Disarmament Decade. The first was the preliminary bilateral talks on strategic arms limitation which took place in Helsinki late last year. The modest success achieved during those preliminary talks has now, happily, led to the agreement for a second round of talks between the United States and the USSR in Vienna. In his statement in this Committee recently, the United Nations Secretary-General pointed out:

> "It has been said that the bilateral strategic arms limitation talks are the most important international negotiations since the Second World War... Progress in those talks will undoubtedly have a most important bearing on all of the work of the Committee on Disarmament. I believe that if the two

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parties could agree, pursuant to the appeal of the General Assembly, to a moratorium on the further testing and the deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems, this would be the single most important first step to prevent the escalation of the nuclear arms race. It would constitute a break-through in disarmament negotiations and would have an immeasurable beneficial effect on all aspects of disarmament and indeed for world peace." (CCD/PV.450, para.23)

78. The second event was the entry into force of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty which I mentioned earlier. The third was the coincidence of the launching of the Disarmament Decade with the twenty-fifty anniversary of the birth of the United Nations itself. All those factors, in our opinion, augur well for the new Decade.

79. In a subject as difficult and complicated as disarmament, which is itself subject to rapidly changing circumstances, it is easy to err on the optimistic side. There is no doubt, however, that a lot depends on the nuclear-weapon States in ensuring that the improvement, slight though it may be, in the political atmosphere of the world is maintained and enhanced. On the other hand, it is the responsibility of all of us, nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon countries alike, to ensure that this planet is habitable not only for ourselves but also for generations yet unborn. This, therefore, is the significance of having a timetable, the significance of charting our course through the turbulent seas of disarmament negotiations. It is the view of my delegation that in doing this we should be bold enough to set target dates for achieving general objectives. Although such targets may not always be easy to attain, it is clear that on any topic whatever there is a limit to what can usefully be said. When that limit is reached the only further step open to us is action. Granting good will, success should attend our endeavours.

80. The declaration of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade brings into focus the question of general and complete disarmament, which is the ultimate objective of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. In the early years of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee that Committee devoted considerable attention to general and complete disarmament. In fact, as we all know, the Co-chairmen each submitted a programme (ENDC/2/Rev.1, ENDC/30 and Add.1-3) on the subject. Since then, however, while we have certainly not lost sight of this objective, our discussions have tended to revolve more and more around collateral and non-armament measures which, useful as

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they may be, are sometimes less urgent or important. I am not by any means suggesting that we should have ignored collateral measures because they are less important. In the first place, they certainly contribute to the building up of much-needed confidence, which in turn will facilitate the achievement of our goal of general and complete disarmament. Secondly, a particular collateral measure may at a certain stage acquire greater importance and urgency than other disarmament measures, and in any case, as pointed out by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Khallaf, in his statement on 24 February:

> "... importance and urgency alone are not the only criteria for setting up priorities; for we shall have to keep in mind our possibilities, the degree of maturity attained by the various issues; and the conditions prevailing on the international scene." (CCD/PV.452, para.39)

81. However, it is evident that in spite of the notable progress we have made in negotiating collateral and non-armament measures we all share a sense of failure, which to my mind arises mainly from our consciousness of the fact that not only has progress been slow but also we have not maintained a balance among various measures to prevent armament, to limit armament and to disarm. The concern of the outside world and in particular of the United Nations General Assembly at the slow progress of our work and the lopsidedness of our achievements was made manifest in the speeches of many delegates to the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly and in the directive incorporated in its resolution which requests this Committee:

> "... to work out... a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control ..." (resolution 2602 E (XXIV))

82. There is yet another reason why we should mount a frontal attack on general and complete disarmament. As has been confirmed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and many other speakers who have taken the floor at this session of our Committee, the momentum of the arms race continues unabated and global military expenditures have reached astronomical figures, while more than half the population of the world live in poverty and want. These two factors by themselves are constant reminders of the urgency of our work if mankind is to be saved from the scourge of war and from total annihilation. The call is loud and clear: we must revitalize our efforts and formulate a comprehensive but flexible programme in the field of arms

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control and disarmament which will serve as a guideline to chart the course of our future work. It must be a realistic, logical, co-ordinated programme which on the one hand recognizes the interrelationship between various measures of disarmament and on the other takes cognizance of political realities.

83. General and complete disarmament involves a complex and intricate process of negotiations. Experience should teach us at least that it cannot be achieved at a single leap because, as the representative of Italy pointed out in his statement of 26 February:

> "... though the existence of the draft treaties on general and complete disarmament presented in 1962 by the co-Chairman (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and ENDC/30 and Add.1-3) is certainly encouraging... we must carefully avoid those causes which in the past have brought the consideration of these plans to a halt ... It was hoped that a single legal and political instrument could cover the implementation of linked phases until the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament was reached." (CCD/PV.453, para.16)

Indeed, general and complete disarmament has to proceed by stages beginning with the building up of confidence by the imaginative selection of measures on which agreements are relatively easy and then proceeding progressively with more difficult issues. In this connexion non-armament measures such as, for example, the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*), tend to create the necessary mutual confidence, but while we may continue to work further on such measures an ideal programme of work should enable us to tackle simultaneously at this stage the question of the limitation of arms. As the Secretary-General stated in his address to us on 18 February (CCD/PV.450, para.20), there exist elements of such a programme in the two draft treaties for general and complete disarmament presented in 1962 by the United States (ENDC/30 and Add.1-3) and the USSR (ENDC/2/Rev.1). My delegation joins those who have spoken before me in expressing the hope that the co-Chairmen will, with a view to providing the guidelines to facilitate our work, take early steps to revise and bring up to date their draft treaties in the light of the developments that have taken place and the experience acquired since they were first submitted.

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84. A few minutes ago I suggested that it was time we embarked upon serious consideration of arms limitation measures. I must nevertheless sound a note of warning. In the field of nuclear disarmament we, the unarmed, have agreed, by the non-proliferation Treaty, to be disarmed. This, however, will not be acceptable as setting the pattern for every aspect of disarmament. In this connexion I refer to the suggestion for the limitation of trade in conventional arms. It is true that military expenditures all over the world have reached staggering proportions, and the limitation of conventional weapons comes within the purview of our mandate. But, as the representative of Argentina has rightly pointed out:

> "the burden of the arms race ... certainly does not lie on the sale of conventional weapons, often of doubtful offensive value, but is due to the production of all types of armaments, especially nuclear weapons, by a small number of technologically and industrially highly-developed countries." (CCD/PV.454,para.18)

It is one thing to limit the production of arms in the world as a whole but another to impose a limit on trade in conventional arms alone. If the purpose of the latter is to reduce military expenditure its effect will be marginal. What is more, it would be tantamount to a discriminatory measure against a vast number of States which do not produce arms but yet need them at least for internal security purposes, while the few which can produce arms would still be free to produce and stockpile them in unlimited quantities. Such a situation would only foster a sense of insecurity among those who had been disarmed unilaterally, as it were, and would, paradoxically, jeopardize that very peace which the protagonists of such a measure apparently seek to stabilize.

85. I now turn to the question of the banning of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. This is a subject closely related to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI). The General Assembly recognized this in its appeal "for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol" (resolution 2603 (XXIV); CCD/275), before dealing with its request that this Committee give urgent consideration to reaching agreement on the problem of the elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. Obviously, if the Geneva Protocol became glaringly ineffective the type and scope of the new treaty we

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would be required to elaborate would be affected. But we believe it would be far wiser to ensure world-wide accession to and observance of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 than to erode it under the guise of strengthening it. This is the significance of the confirmatory resolution 2603 A (XXIV), sponsored by twenty-one States including Nigeria and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its twenty-fourth session. We are not unaware that certain States have raised objections and made reservations to the resolution but we also note -- and here we wish to congratulate the United States and Japan in particular -- that there have been moves in the direction of accession to the Protocol by those countries which have so far not acceded.

86. President Nixon's statements of 25 November 1969 and 15 February 1970, which unilaterally renounced the use by the United States of all lethal offensive biological weapons and toxins in addition to confirming the renunciation by the United States of the first use of lethal chemical weapons including incapacitating chemicals, are a welcome move even though we fail to understand the necessity for the use of such qualifying words as "lethal" and "incapacitating" in the Unites States statements. Obviously, the dosage or chemical content of a weapon could determine whether it was lethal or not. It is the hope of my delegation that the United States Government will continue this move in what we consider to be the right direction and that others will do the same, thus making less onerous our task of elaborating a treaty prohibiting chemical and bacteriological weapons.

87. We have before us two documents representing the initiatives of the United Kingdom (ENDC/255/Rev.1) and the USSR and eight other socialist States (A/7655) on this subject. The Nigerian delegation has both here and at the United Nations expressed its preference for a single treaty dealing with both chemical and biological weapons. Whether this be in separate sections is to us of minor importance but there is sufficient similarity between the principles involved to provide a basis for common articles in such a treaty. It may perhaps be necessary -- for example, in the case of verification, to which I shall come later -- to make separate provisions. Because of our view in regard to the type of treaty desirable, we consider that the Soviet draft offers a suitable basis for negotiations.

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88. My friend and colleague, Mr. Leonard of the United States of America, in his statement to this Committee on 17 March, concluded that "it does not seem feasible at present to negotiate a single agreement prohibiting both chemical and biological weapons" (CCD/PV.458, para.47). His main reasons for reaching such a conclusion are, as far as I can see, that an agreement on biological weapons would be worth while whereas one on chemical weapons would depend upon developing reliable and negotiable verification arrangements. My delegation agrees with these views but notes further that because of its nature the biological weapon is very unlikely to be used in warfare. In fact, as proof of this statement, such a weapon has never been used in war. On the other hand, we know that the dangers of chemical warfare are with us. It is for this reason that my delegation feels that the elaboration of a treaty banning the use of chemical weapons is even more important than that of one banning the use of biological weapons. The indications are that the verification problems referred to by the United States delegation are not insurmountable. Therefore, in line with the 1925 Geneva Protocol and with reports that we have received on these questions, we would prefer not to prejudge the issue by concentrating only on the less imminent danger of a biological war.

89. We have listened attentively to the views that have been expressed on the expediency of including, in spite of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the prohibition of the use of those weapons in the proposed convention. We appreciate the arguments put forward that nothing should be done to detract from the effectiveness of the Geneva Protocol, but we do not think that restating the prohibition of the use of the weapons in the new convention would necessarily affect the Protocol adversely. In fact we believe that if, as in the United Kingdom draft, such a provision went beyond the prohibition of first use to impose a total ban on both first and retaliatory uses it would strengthen the aims of the Geneva Protocol. However, since our proposed convention is intended not only to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of those weapons but also to provide for the elimination of existing stocks, the question of a total ban on their use becomes academic, as one cannot use what does not exist. Consequently we would support the formulation in the draft of the socialist countries, which recognises in its preamble the validity of the Geneva convention but does not substantively prohibit the use of biological and chemical weapons. Thus any controversy as to the possible effect on the Protocol is avoided.

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90. I should like now to turn to the intractable problem of verification. The Soviet draft does not go beyond seeking the consent and co-operation of States signatory to the treaty for resolving questions which may arise in connexion with the implementation of the treaty. This is an important issue, particularly where, as in this case, effective and meaningful verification is essential. Any system of verification must be credible and must inspire confidence in order to avert the slightest suspicion on the part of signatories to the treaty. In addition, a verification arrangement should have an element of deterrence to would-be violators. Fortunately the evidence is that such a credible verification arrangement is possible. In the latest report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on the problem of chemical and biological warfare, five main methods which could be used for formal verification are listed and it would appear that, contrary to our earlier idea that those weapons can easily be produced in back-room kitchens or in garages, the safety and other technical problems of manufacture and control make it necessary for production to be carried out in large identifiable units. Here again the provision in the United Kingdom draft for a complaints procedure and for security assurances would appear to be appropriate for consideration in order to strengthen the Soviet draft.

91. My delegation would also like to see included in the Soviet draft an obligation on parties to the treaty to assist one another if they are victims of a chemical or biological attack.

92. General Assembly resolution 2604 B(XXIV) (CCD/275) calls upon this Committee "as a matter of urgency" to submit to the Assembly a special report on our deliberations in connexion with a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. If we have achieved nothing, or very little, on that subject so far it is not owing to lack of interest or effort on our part. Perhaps, as in the case of all other important nuclear disarmament measures, progress can only be achieved if the two super-Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, seriously desire such progress and are therefore willing to accept the limitations to sovereignty which such steps would necessitate. That is why my delegation welcomed the announcement during the twenty-fourth General Assembly of an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States to begin talks on strategic arms limitation, and that is also why we shall follow with the keenest interest the next round of talks, expected to begin in Austria on 16 April.

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93. Another bilateral meeting in Austria seeks to define peaceful nuclear explosions. That is a very important task, since it will determine what tests involving nuclear explosions would, for peaceful research purposes, be allowed to continue. It will also clarify certain points connected with obligations undertaken by non-nuclear-weapon States under the non-proliferation Treaty -- that is, whether, since the objective of the Treaty is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, tests involving explosions for peaceful purposes could be excluded under the non-proliferation Treaty in the same manner as they would no doubt be excluded under a comprehensive test-ban treaty if mankind is to benefit from the peaceful uses, both at present and in the future, of atomic energy. We are happy to note that the International Atomic Energy Agency is itself taking an interest in this matter. It is our view that if progress is made in these bilateral negotiations the chances of our elaborating a comprehensive test ban treaty will be very much enhanced.

94. One may perhaps be pardoned if one draws an analogy between the comprehensive test ban and the question of the banning of chemical and biological warfare. In each case a partial international agreement exists, and what we are seeking to achieve is a reinforcement or an augmentation of the present agreement. In each case also the existing agreement is yet to be fully adhered to by all States. Therefore, as in the case of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, my delegation would implore States that have not adhered to all the existing treaties relating to nuclear weapons and tests to do so.

95. In that connexion I wish to draw attention to the suggestion of the Secretary-General in his address to us on 18 February that we might examine the implications of the development of the gas centrifuge method of producing enriched uranium (CCD/PV.450, para.19). That method is, I have been advised, a cheaper means, compared with the fusion method, of producing enriched uranium, even for military purposes. The implication of this, as I see it, is that technologically developed countries which have not signed the non-proliferation Treaty and have not hitherto been able to embark upon the fusion method of producing enriched uranium for weapons purposes because of its high cost may now find the centrifuge method cheap enough to utilize for those purposes.

96. I should now like to say a few words about the sea-bed treaty. We have before us the draft treaty presented by the co-Chairmen on 30 October 1969 (CCD/269/Rev.1), as well as the various proposals which have been submitted. My delegation has

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expressed its views in detail on the draft both here and in New York and it is not necessary to reiterate them. Suffice it to say, however, that we still fully support the Swedish amendment (CCD/271), that the pledge contained in the third paragraph of the preamble to continue negotiations on further measures leading to the exclusion of the sea-bed from the arms race should be incorporated in the operative part of the treaty. Furthermore we still maintain that the rights of coastal States should be guaranteed and the verification procedures amended in line with the Canadian proposals (CCD/270). In this connexion we observe that the revised Canadian proposals submitted in New York (A/C.1/992) have been weakened, particularly in regard to the right to inspection of suspected installations and the right of coastal States in regard to inspections on their continental shelves. I believe that the adoption of the original Canadian proposals would ensure a wider acceptance of the proposed treaty. Finally, we find the Argentinian amendment (A/C.1/997) to articles I and II to be an acceptable compromise. At least it specifically defines as twelve miles the outer limit of the coastal zone beyond which the prohibition of the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction would be effective, although it still relates that definition to the provisions of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.1/

97. I hope that in order to save time and ensure the successful conclusion of the sea-bed treaty the co-Chairmen will not only take those views into consideration in revising their text but will also arrange extensive informal discussions of the revised draft when it is ready and before it is formally submitted.

98. Before I end my statement I should like to comment briefly on one or two procedural matters. I am in complete agreement with the statement of the representative of Sweden that a first requirement of our Committee is a sharp increase in productivity (CCD/PV.450, para.34). My delegation deeply appreciates the imaginative suggestions with which she followed up her diagnosis of our needs as well as those submitted by the representative of Mexico (CCD/277), among others.

99. While I agree in principle with the suggestion that the allocation of specific subjects with which we are seized to working groups for examination in greater depth may improve the pace of our work, I entertain some doubts as to its efficacy in practice. The efficiency of a sub-committee or working group is partly derived from its small size and partly from the representative character of its membership. Unfortunately, since the membership of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament

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1/ United Nations Treaty Series, Vol.516, pp.205 et seq.

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is composed of representatives of sovereign governments and consequently each member operates in accordance with the instructions received from his government, it is practically impossible to appoint any small working group representative of the various shades of opinion in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament itself. The appointment of a working group must therefore necessarily leave the door open for other members of the Committee to join if they wish. Thus in the circumstances in which we operate a working group is likely to become a committee of the whole. Irrespective of the size of a working group it is most important that the group should be able to discuss and exchange views freely and informally. But regrettably even that most important element may be missing in our working groups unless the attitudes and dispositions I have observed so far in our Committee change. In our informal meetings, for example, exchanges are supposed to be free and off the record, yet there is a discernible penchant for reading prepared statements. That disposition is certainly not conducive to efficiency, since the essence of informal meetings and working groups is the spontaneous give and take of debates and the rapid exchange of information and ideas. I understand that in fact the organization of working parties or sub-committees has been tried previously in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament without success.

100. My delegation will certainly support any measures that will increase the productivity of this Committee. All I am saying is that in adopting any measure we must at least make sure that we are prepared to adapt ourselves to its requirements. Until we make up our minds and overcome our present disabilities, my delegation will certainly support the other proposals of the representative of the Swedish delegation that:

> "we should ... definitely maintain the possibility of discussing more freely than is usually the case at the formal meetings both procedural questions and matters of substance ... Delegations, working individually or co-operatively, could more frequently submit draft texts or similar working papers to serve as building elements in our attempt to construct new disarmament agreements." (CCD/PV.450, para.35)

Furthermore, I think that we should for the time being broaden and intensify the private exchanges of views which, in my view, are even more rewarding than the organized exchanges.

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101. I have read the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute report on "The ENDC and the Press" and I would not have touched upon its main conclusion here, except that the representative of Mexico raised the issue in his working paper of 5 March. The document referred to suggests that the official or formal meetings of the Committee "at which each representative confines himself to reading a carefully prepared text" be made public, like those of the First Committee of the United Nations.

102. I quite understand the preoccupation of well-informed world opinion with our work which has engendered that suggestion. However, I think that it is a fallacy to equate the work of this Committee with that of the First Committee. The latter is a deliberating Committee while ours is essentially a negotiating Committee, whether prepared speeches are read or not. All of us would agree, I am sure, that that is an undeniable difference in the character of the two Committees. That being so, I also believe it is generally accepted that prudence dictates that negotiations should not be thrown open to the glare of publicity, at least until an agreement or irreconcilable disagreement is reached. I need not go into the details of the evils of publicity between negotiations, such as the natural tendency to play to the gallery. I concede of course the mature attitude of members of this Committee but the tendency to play to the gallery is a human tendency from which no one is free. Only, therefore, if we were agreed that the Committee on Disarmament is essentially not a negotiating but a deliberative body, could we make all our meetings, not just the formal ones, open to the public, including journalists. In any case, I think that most members here have learned from a letter recently circulated by the resident journalists themselves that they do not think that the Committee would "get more or better coverage if formal meetings were opened to the Press or an official Press spokesman were provided".

103. I will conclude with a quotation: "By their fruits ye shall know them" (Matthew, vii, 20). The danger of armament and the importance of our work need to be publicized but that can best be achieved not so much through opening our meetings to journalists as through achieving significant disarmament measures which will capture the imagination of the world as a whole and focus its attention on the dangers of the remaining arms.

104. The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I have an announcement to make on behalf of the co-Chairmen:

"The delegation of Sweden has requested that an informal meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament be convened on Wednesday, 22 April 1970, to discuss the question of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. If agreeable to the other members of the Committee, this meeting will be held at 10.30 a.m. on 22 April."

If there is no comment, I take it that this is agreed.

It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 462nd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Afework Zelleke, representative of Ethiopia.

"Statements were made by the representative of the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Burma and Nigeria.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 9 April 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.